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Abstract Although natural resource exploitation has a long tradition, modern re-
source management is a more recent phenomenon. The huge variety in natural 
resource exploitation has made it difficult to place the industrial harvesting of 
marine living resources under political and managerial control. For most of his-
tory fish and fishing people have for all practical purposes been unmanageable. 
From the late 1960s, when it became apparent that important fisheries resources 
were about to be overexploited by industrial technologies, the process to trans-
form fish, fishing people and fishing technologies to make them manageable has 
intensified. The management process contributes to an organizational change in 
the fisheries in which cybernetic forms of organization create complex and het-
erogeneous networks linking together nature, society, technology, science, mar-
kets, and policy in new ways. With Actor-Network Theory (ant) and the history 
of industrial commercial fisheries in Norway, Canada and worldwide as points 
of departure, this article outlines a theoretical framework for the study of how 
natural and social entities are transformed and linked together to become modern 
fisheries resource management.
Introduction: Managing the Unmanageable
While North Atlantic coastal fisheries for cod were labour intensive, community-
based and low tech fisheries well into the 1980s (Johnsen 2005), today they are 
radically different in terms of technology and how they are organized.1 Several 
studies from Norway, Canada and other North Atlantic countries describe radical 
changes in technology, organization, fleet structure, knowledge, fisheries man-
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agement, property rights, and relationships to communities across a number of 
fisheries (see for example: Apostle et al. 2002; Eythorsson 2000; Hersoug 2005; 
Pálsson 2000). In many of these studies, fisheries management plays a key role in 
the changes, even if it is not the only driver. Moreover, fisheries management is 
not a new phenomenon. To manage fish became important when fish became ob-
jects in economic exchange rather than a source of food for local subsistence. Ma-
rine life appears far less manageable when it is experienced in the wild. But such 
management has focussed on the economic and societal aspects, not on resource 
utilization and biological sustainability, as key concerns in modern fisheries re-
source management (Apostle et al. 2002; Holm 2001). For centuries, under the 
Mare Liberum regime and with the pre-industrial fishing industry, fishing could 
take place in a free-for-all and nobody had knowledge, competence, or means to 
control fish and fishers (Pontecorvo 1988; Bavington this issue). Today, however, in 
most of the western-industrialized world, management of the fisheries and the re-
source system is not only an abstract possibility, but an actual material force in the 
world. While the extent to which management succeeds has been debated, there 
is no doubt that resource management is a practical reality. With the adoption of 
the un Law of the Sea Convention in 1983 and the international acceptance of the 
200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones for Coastal States, more than ninety-five per-
cent of fisheries resources were brought under national jurisdiction. Mare Liberum 
was replaced by Mare Governabilicus with management authority invested in the 
coastal state (Apostle et al. 2002; Caddy and Cochrane 2001; Holm 1994).
This process came to a symbolic peak in 1983. During the two decades 
since then, the slow pace of Mare Liberum has been replaced by swift and dramatic 
reform activities in a number of key areas (Caddy and Cochrane 2001). During the 
1980s and 1990s the process of bringing ‘the unmanageables’ under control speed-
ed up, with subsequent debates and disputes about the models, means, organiza-
tions, and institutions of fisheries management. During this period the manage-
ment discourse centred around three different approaches. First, there were those 
who followed Hardin (1968) and his tragedy-of-the-commons model, arguing for 
a strong state – a Leviathan to enforce scientific management regulations. Sec-
ond, there were those who followed Hardin’s advice to enclose the commons and 
argued for privatization and the use of market forces in fisheries management. 
Third, there were the contextualists who argued that common-property resource 
exploitation had to be understood and regulated within holistic frameworks that 
included cultural, social and institutional factors (Hannesson 2006; McCay and 
Acheson 1987; Pálson 1991).
The processes we describe in this special issue are scientifically complex. 
Fisheries management requires the application of science to translate fish, fisher 
folks and communities into abstract objects that can be handled by the manage-
ment system. Fish stocks are counted and assessed for management purposes 
on a regular basis in all the world’s oceans, as Bavington describes in his article 
(this issue). However, even if science is a powerful transformative force, it does 
not remain unchanged in the confrontations with real fish, fishing people, and 
fishing communities to name a few of the many fleshy actors involved. Science 
is also not able to transform and translate everyone and everything (Latour 1999; 
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Mansfield 2003). One indication of the massive failure of scientific translation in 
action is the present state in many fisheries. Actually, many crises involving fish-
ery collapse have occurred while the fisheries have been under scientific fisheries 
management. This has been interpreted by fishery scholars as knowledge crises 
(see Jentoft 1991; Neis et al. 1999; Pálsson 2000; Neis and Felt 2000). It requires 
a lot of work to address knowledge crises and this tends to meet heavy resistance 
by a number of entrenched actors with threatened interests. This is Bavington’s 
point of departure in his article exploring the history of cod fisheries management 
in Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. Indeed, transforming unmanageable 
objects into manageable ones is not an easy task, as Sinclair and his companions 
describe in their piece (this issue) exploring the knowledge network associated 
with federal cod fisheries management in Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. 
Both articles highlight the problems that occur when one or a limited number of 
persons or groups have the power to define rational action and what constitutes 
legitimate knowledge. While debate continues on the appropriate framework for 
understanding fisheries management there is no doubt that both the fish and 
fishers have been transformed. The fish have been transformed into measureable 
and controllable single species populations (Bavington this issue). Fishers have 
been transformed from commoners and hunters into businessmen and property 
owners (Apostle et al. 2002) and ultimately into fishing actors constituted through 
increasingly cybernetic relationships as Johnsen, Murray and Neis describe in 
their article in this issue. Our articles highlight changes in the fisheries that have 
taken place parallel to the development of fisheries management from a modest 
attempt at crisis management, through the ambition of rationalization by means 
of state governance into a framework within which the fisheries can unfold in an 
ordered, profitable and rational pattern, with a number of strong actors and inter-
est groups (Holm 2001; Johnsen 2004).
The main question we address in this special issue of mast is how shall 
we conceptualise and understand the changes that have taken place in North At-
lantic fisheries since the Second World War. In the remainder of this article we 
present the theoretical approach that has guided our collective studies of changes 
in the fisheries sector. To answer the question above we created new concepts to 
understand what has been going on in some of the North Atlantic fisheries since 
the 1970s.
The impressive quality and quantity of diverse disciplinary and interdis-
ciplinary studies during the last two decades on North Atlantic Fisheries have 
produced important insights into changes in the fisheries. There have been sev-
eral studies that have examined the introduction and effect of centralized and/or 
market management as opposed to more decentralised, user-based, or participa-
tory-based management systems. In these studies there have been a number of 
helpful new concepts and knowledge generated and it seems fair to ask, ‘Don’t we 
have enough concepts and knowledge in this field?’. Our collective answer is ‘No!’. 
With calls to base fisheries management on best practices and good governance 
approaches, we believe it is becoming evident that in the fisheries management 
community there is an urgent need to learn how to cope with uncertain natural 
resource fluctuations and make difficult choices between a variety of practices, 
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organizations and institutions. In order to understand these difficult choices and 
what is at stake in fisheries management insight into how relations that constitute 
fishery actors and actions change in character and substance will become neces-
sary. ‘The fisher’ in a household-based seasonal fishery is relationally different 
from ‘the fisher’ we find onboard today’s highly sophisticated vessels, and we need 
language and concepts that make it possible to distinguish between them and un-
derstand the consequences of the change. Thus, our ambition is to contribute to 
the development of concepts that clarify and pinpoint the relational changes and 
that help display how management is practised and has become institutionalised 
in North Atlantic fisheries today.
Following theorists like McCay and Acheson (1987), Jentoft et al. (1998) and 
Pálsson (1991) we have a relational understanding of the world of fisheries. Follow-
ing these relationalists and based on the relational inspired methodology developed 
within the sociology and history of science, in particular Actor-Network theory and 
environmental history (Callon 1986; Latour 1993; 1999; Law 2004; Latour 2005), we 
describe the complex processes of change occurring in contemporary North Atlan-
tic fisheries as cyborgization. Cyborgization changes fisheries from being constitut-
ed by close, affective and to a great extent informal relations to a sector more domi-
nated by formalised cybernetic relations. Affective relations are the type of relations 
that we find in civil society, in the family and in the informal practices of everyday 
life (Kooiman, Bavinck et al. 2005; Murray et al. 2006; Johnsen et al. this issue).
Through cyborgization fishery actors become reconstituted with new abilities and 
properties. Neither fish, fishers, managers nor technologies remain untouched by 
the process (Johnsen et al. this issue). Even though this article focuses on phenom-
ena and consequences that will easily be perceived as negative, it must be added that 
technological, cybernetic and managerial developments have also contributed to 
make fishing into a safer and easier livelihood over the short term. Our approach is 
not to argue that it is better ‘to fish with three men and six aching arms, than with 
one man and three jigging machines’ as a Norwegian fisheries minister has ac-
cused academics of supporting.2 The point is to describe how the fishing actor has 
changed and the consequences of this change when the relations between three 
fishermen are replaced by mechanical relations among machines. Without such 
knowledge it will be difficult to develop appropriate and enduring fishing tools and 
practices that can be judged suitable for particular places, people and times.
The empirical foundation for this article is based on our research in the 
fisheries3 in combination with studies of fishery-related scientific texts and docu-
ments. In addition, the article builds on independent empirical material from Nor-
way and Canada but examples could easily be selected from any highly or over-de-
veloped western fishery. All the articles in this issue adopt an exploratory approach 
and describe changes in fisheries as part of or parallel to changes in management. 
The stories told in the articles are about the struggle to manage and modernize 
North Atlantic fisheries. First, in this introductory article we describe the attempts 
to build a strong centralised management and governance system in the fisheries 
as a part of the modernization process. Second, we present a central mechanism 
in modern resource management, and in the last part of the article we concentrate 
on the outcome of the cyborgization processes and recent developments.
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Crisis Management, the Leviathan and the Fishing Cyborgs
As described above, solving resource crises was the trigger for modern fisheries re-
source management. In accordance with the prominent ideas developed by biolo-
gists and economists in the 1950s and 1960s, governments were to play the most 
important role (Jentoft et al. 1998). ‘“The Fisheries Leviathan” symbolises a strong 
presence of government in fisheries resource management’ (Jentoft et al. 1998:425) 
and the idea represents a struggle towards a panoptic fisheries sector where the 
managers through science and rationality could survey and control the fisheries, 
(see Foucault 1977 and Latour 2005). Dean Bavington’s article in this issue illus-
trates how this idea of resource management was a key element in the struggle 
to construct ‘the Fisheries Leviathan’. Both Bavington and Sinclair, Johnsen and 
Ripley (this issue) address how scientific knowledge and instrumental rationality 
are produced and deployed through political, technological and scientific develop-
ment. Their stories about the struggle to manage the Northern cod in Newfound-
land and Labrador (nl) are also stories about how the Fisheries Leviathan and 
panoptic fisheries management in nl never became a reality in the ideal form. 
However, the idea of resource management survived the collapse of the Northern 
cod and the Leviathan, and the idea of a strong role for government in fisheries 
management became embedded in processes of cyborgization of the fisheries. These 
processes towards more cybernetic organised fisheries are the subject for Johnsen, 
Murray and Neis’ article in this issue. In this article, the authors describe the or-
ganizational changes in fishing practices that followed the struggle for and failure 
of a panoptic fisheries management and how these changes led to redefinition, 
reorganization and reinstitutionalization of fisheries management. The outcome 
of the processes they describe is cybernetic fisheries organizations – fishing cyborgs 
through which people, fish and management are related in new ways.
By addressing these changes, the articles in this issue of mast explore one 
side of modernity, namely the technologies for controlling and constituting the rela-
tionships between humans, nature, and society. Our research project, ‘The coming 
of the Cyborg Fish – on how objects become manageable’, from which the collection 
of articles in this issue of mast is the outcome, has produced insight into the prac-
tices by which modernisation changes the world and how modern institutions gain 
control over nature, humans, and society. Different from what we expected at the 
beginning of the project, this control is not total or panoptic. Instead of the strong 
Leviathan, which we believed could be found in the fisheries, there are now several 
smaller, but highly effective devices for control and feedback that delegate control 
responsibility to the actors themselves4 and to their interest-based organisations or-
ganizations (Apostle et al. 2002).5 As Johnsen et al. describe, the result is that the 
actors change radically and that their relational configuration becomes rearranged.
The processes we describe are not necessarily negative. Our attempt is to 
explore and describe them to make sure that the institutional set up and the re-
lational configurations can be known and become subject to societal and demo-
cratic control. Democratic control is particularly important because the right to 
fish is a privilege for the few, and because there is a potential for conflict between 
the privileged fishers and those who take part in what Nordstrand and Holm (this 
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issue) call the refurbishing of the coast. This refurbishing is undertaken both by 
former fishers and new actors who involve themselves in the development of new 
livelihood and businesses based on fishery resources. Through these activities, 
they claim to be accepted as legitimate stakeholders in fisheries management. By 
doing this they also challenge the ‘last commons’ in Norwegian fisheries, namely 
recreational and food fisheries.
The Rise and the Fall of the Fisheries Leviathan
Before the 1930s the North Atlantic fisheries mainly consisted of close and af-
fective relations between humans and fish. Community and commons func-
tioned through complex, informal social relations without centralised scientific 
systems for representation, governance, and intervention. The transformations 
of the North Atlantic fisheries during the 1930s, when our history has its origin, 
changed this situation both in Norway and Canada (Holm 1995; Wright 2001).
For example, in 1937, ten years after the Norwegian fishermen, with support 
from the state, had started to gain control over first hand fish sales and after the 
introduction of the first temporary Trawler Act in 1936 regulating trawling activity 
in Norwegian waters, the Fisheries Profitability Committee (fpc) (Lønnsomhetsut-
valget 1937) proposed a program for technological and institutional moderniza-
tion of the Norwegian fisheries. The program defined governance, institutional 
change, and technological development as the three pillars for modernization. 
Consequently, the outcome of this program was a fisheries governance system 
where the state took considerable responsibility for economic development in the 
fisheries. This governance system was built upon laws and the establishment of 
mandated institutions that had executive responsibility, inside a corporative sys-
tem where the Norwegian fishermen’s association (nfa), in accordance with the 
proposal from the majority in fpc, played an important role (Hersoug 2005; Holm 
1995). This was not unique for Norway; also in nl, involvement from the state and 
the state planners’ vision of development as a product of capitalism, technological 
development and rational state planning contributed to changing the nl fisheries 
in the same direction. The point was to ‘modernize’ the fisheries (Wright 2001).
However, the growth of the governance system and institutional reorgani-
sation were only two pillars of the modernization program. The third pillar was 
technological development. From at least the 1960s, industrial fishing technology 
became so effective that fish and fishing people became endangered around the 
world. Thus, parallel to the growth of an increasingly strong fisheries Leviathan for 
management and governance of the fisheries, the fish capture capacity continued 
to expand, inducing needs for new and improved management instruments and 
the organization of different scales of management into a comprehensive govern-
ance system working at many levels and through many different relations. With 
this increasing complexity the Leviathan became entangled in a web of different 
instruments, stakeholder groups, policies and sciences that made panoptic control 
and management impossible. Furthermore, rationality, truth and decision mak-
ing in the system became objects for negotiation between scientists, users, politi-
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cians and bureaucrats, and consequently the rational foundation of management 
became challenged (Finlayson 1994; Sinclair et al. this issue). The modernization 
program had started a never ending process of intensifying management opera-
tion. To be able to act and to keep rationality as a foundation, management had to 
be organised in a way that delegated responsibilities and divided politics and sci-
ence. One of these mechanisms, the tac-machine, played a prominent role.
Transforming Fish – The tac-machine
Modern fisheries science, which originated during the industrial revolution, de-
veloped as a technology for industrial development and expansion, not for the 
preservation of wild fish or the way of life associated with hunting them for a 
living. The 1870s was a decade of large expeditions and explorations of the seas, 
followed by a period of close to 100 years in which fisheries biology and economics 
functioned as hand maidens for finding pockets of unexploited fishery resources. 
In this period, fisheries research was essentially an expensive apparatus for the 
expansion of profitable harvesting operations in the world’s fisheries (Rozwad-
owski 2002; imr 2004; Holm and Nielsen 2007).
Although fish finding was important, it was not enough to found and in-
stitutionalise modern fisheries science by itself. Through oceanographic expedi-
tions, experimental fishing, and the orderly collection of catch information from 
fishers and other sources, marine researchers from many countries have amassed 
a tremendous amount of empirical data about the seas, materials that can be used 
for calculating, measuring and modelling economically profitable marine life. Al-
most a century after the first scientific experiments into the realm of fisheries, 
there was finally a breakthrough with the invention of a simple, but effective, stock 
assessment technology. The period from 1965 to 1975 represents the breakthrough 
of Virtual Population Analysis (vpa) assessment methodology in fisheries science 
and the emergence of Total Allowable Catch (tac) as an important management 
instrument. Now, finally, a division of labour between scientists and managers 
could be established (Holm and Nielsen 2007; Nielsen and Holm 2008).
As an ideal type, modern resource management represented by the tac-
machine can be described as a sub-set of control strategies within the more ge-
neric category of governance by which objects, processes, people or practices are 
handled indirectly through a system of representation (Holm 1996; Nielsen and 
Holm 2008). Management is thus based on the development and deployment of a 
symbolic and formal system of power and knowledge (the management system) 
that corresponds to and controls, but also greatly simplifies a system of practices 
(the system to be managed). A fundamental precondition for management to suc-
ceed is that the system of representation, through some technology of interven-
tion, is linked to a system of practices so that it becomes possible to translate, com-
municate, and intervene across these two realms (Holm 2001; Nielsen and Holm 
2008). On this hinges not only how closely the symbolic system will correspond to 
the system of practices, but also the effectiveness with which decisions within the 
former can be transported to the latter.
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Figure 1.  Fisheries resource management understood as a historical cybernetic 
control mechanism based on a system of scientific representation and 
a system of instrumental intervention. Based on Nielsen, K.N. and 
P. Holm. 2007. “A brief catalogue of failures: Framing evaluation and 
learning in fisheries resource management.” Marine Policy 31:669-680.
The establishment of the ‘tac machine’ (Holm and Nielsen 2007; Nielsen and 
Holm 2008), together with the new oceans regime that was negotiated through 
the 1970s, represents two major preconditions for cyborgization of the fisheries 
through the development of cybernetic subsystems that require a wide range of 
novel scientific representations, definitions, and measurements of fish, fishing 
and the fisherman (Holm 2003; Johnsen 2004; 2005; Nielsen and Holm 2008). 
Thus, today, fisheries science – a blend of fisheries biology, oceanography and 
computer modelling tools – is a main ingredient in the (attempted) production of 
sustainable fisheries resource management. In addition to finding fish, describ-
ing and modelling the seas have become important tasks for fisheries scientists. 
Through this process fisheries science was institutionalised within a centre of 
calculation, closely linked both to political institutions and to fisheries as a profit-
seeking trade, but with its own bounded responsibility, namely to set tacs. The 
tac-machine and the management system turn both fish and fishers into entities 
that can be calculated by using different methods, metered out in a variety of 
units, applied for the regulation of a wide range of processes at different stages 
with the systems elements and relations. Through the tac-machine, the wild un-
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manageable fleshy fish of nature can be translated into a domesticated manage-
able object (see Bavington this issue). In this process the fish, as well as the fish-
ers, are continuously redefined and are attributed new properties. Neither the fish 
and the fishers, nor the management system is created once and for all. It becomes 
obvious that the tac-machine does not become the final solution and that it has 
to be supported by other mechanisms. In Norway, the tac-machine is supported 
by long-term keys for allocation of the annual quotas, to avoid the annual struggle 
about quotas. The allocation keys are negotiated between the fishers in the Nor-
wegian Fishermen’s Association and approved by the ministry. The tac-machine 
makes fish counting possible and an allocation machine takes care of the distribu-
tion. Both the tac-machine itself and the mechanisms and systems around it are 
the fountain of a wide range of controversies and disputes that occur in fisheries 
science, management and fishing practices. Because of the involvement from us-
ers the boundary between management system and the system-to-be-managed is 
blurred. All the mechanisms contribute to increased complexity through continu-
ous transformations of the relational set up in the fisheries to which we will now 
turn (also see Bavington, Johnsen et al. and Sinclair et al. in this issue).
Catching Fish – From Affective Human Relations to Cybernetic Capture Systems
Once upon a time there were fish, vessels, and men like those we see in Figure 2. 
In the 1920s, when this photo was taken, human shoulders and arms were still a 
main source of energy in Norwegian and nl fisheries (see Illich, 1973). Although 
there were a few larger steam ships in the herring fisheries, small fishing vessels 
Figure 2.  Fishers, vessel, and fish in the 1920s
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built and owned by fishers dominated. The fishers in the photo are representative 
in this respect. Like many other fishing vessels, this vessel was owned by a fam-
ily partnership, which was also the dominant form of organization in nl (Wright 
2001; Johnsen et al. this issue). The crew members who were not partners, like the 
author’s grandfather (number three from the left in Figure 2) were neighbours 
and more distant relatives, all living in the same community.
The organization and social arrangements in the fisheries are well docu-
mented in historical and ethnographical literature from Norway and nl (Ander-
son and Wadel 1972; Sinclair 1988; Jentoft 1991; Neis 1999; Sinclair, Squires et al. 
1999; Wright 2001; Sinclair 2002; Christensen and Hallenstvedt 2005). The pic-
ture represents fisheries dominated by affective relations. Together, they hunted 
and killed fish from a commons. While the social relationships in the commons 
might have been complex, the relations to the fish were simple and direct. The 
fishers, as members of hungry households and cash strapped communities, were 
after fish that could be both eaten by their families and exchanged for money. The 
vessel was a transportation device and a floating platform for gear handling. The 
basic relationship between fish and fisherman was mediated by the baited hook 
and line. If the baited hook slipped out of the cod’s mouth or the line broke, the 
kids would go hungry to bed. Men fished and fathers taught their sons out on the 
water with baited hook and line hand gear. The hook and line produced the fisher 
as a hunter and killer of fish, but also as an active head of the household and com-
munity member.
During the 1930s, the relationship between fish and fishers started to be-
come more complex, both in technological and institutional terms. With the intro-
duction of trawlers, a continuous all-year industrial capitalist off-shore fishery was 
Figure 3.  Low tech Norwegian fishing vessels from the 1980s (Photo: J.P. Johnsen) 
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added to traditional seasonal fisher-owned coastal fisheries. From a troubled start 
– the trawlers were intensely loathed by the small-scale fishers – an off-shore fleet 
became powerful over the next sixty years (Holm 1995; Wright 2001). Neverthe-
less, within the open commons, for example in Norway, the conventional fisher-
owned fleet was not dramatically influenced by this addition. Both in Norway and 
nl, even as late as the 1980s, the coastal fisheries, while considerably smaller than 
those of the 1920s in number of persons and vessels, had maintained some of the 
geographical distribution, employment system and ownership structure. Even if 
the vessels had become much more technologically sophisticated than their pred-
ecessors, with more powerful engines, hydraulic equipment, echo sounders, ra-
dars, autopilots, and so on, they continued to be striking similar to fisheries in 
the past. Most coastal vessels were still made of wood (Figure 3) and continued 
to exploit the coastal commons. The employment system was basically the same 
with most of the crew members recruited locally, through family or personal rela-
tions. The relations were still mainly affective. To handle 150 to 200 gill nets one 
still needed the energy of an able bodied four five man crew (See Johnsen et al. 
this issue).6
By 2000, this had all changed. By the new millennium, a typical coastal 
fishing vessel in Norway was between thirty and forty-five feet long and often 
made out of fibreglass or steel with the wheelhouse in the front. The vessels have 
become very technologically sophisticated. Usually, no more than three people 
are working aboard, aided by hydraulic haulers and mechanical helpers that rely 
Figure  4. Onboard a modern Norwegian small-scale fish capture machine with 
fish, people gear and all its devices. The skipper is steering with his right 
hand, and is controlling the hydraulic hauler with his left hand, while 
the net clearing device is hanging at the stern.  (Photo: J.P. Johnsen)
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on petrochemical energy to operate. For navigation radar, gps, digital chart ma-
chines, and an autopilot are used. The electronic equipment is integrated with 
the physical boat and by a click on the mouse in the wheelhouse the vessel can 
be steered to a geo-spatial position that the skipper has saved on his computer 
mapping software. All equipment on the boat (except sometimes the radar) can 
be switched on from one main switch in the wheelhouse. It is only the danger of 
collision with other cybernetic vessels that makes it necessary to be on physical 
watch. With quick training almost everybody is now able to navigate like a profes-
sional. While some experience is still useful for finding fish, contemporary echo 
sounders have made even this part of the process easier and deskilled. However, 
the deck machinery is more specialised than on the early 1980 boats and the fish-
ing gear has changed dramatically. Both hauling and clearing are now mecha-
nised, and the gear is adapted to allow mechanised handling. Different types of 
hydraulic gillnet haulers have replaced men’s hands and arms for baiting and 
hauling and clearing gear (figure 4).
Like other forms of industrial production, fishing operations have become 
networked and are now deeply embedded in the service programme and knowl-
edge infrastructure provided by gear manufacturers, shipyards, and other profes-
sional and commodified systems. Many of the skills that were required in the 
1980s have been replaced by other types of activities and knowledge. While a great 
deal of the activities that used to constitute the work of the fishers has now been 
integrated into bureaucratic programs and technological systems, the focus of the 
fishing operators’ responsibilities has shifted toward that of running a business, 
controlling finances and investments, and understanding fishing legislation. 
Henry, a fish harvester, in his early thirties, commented on the changes in his 
work situation like this: ‘You have to be a lawyer when you are at home’.7
The successful fisheries enterprises consist not only of the owners, the 
crew, the vessels, the fish and the quotas available to them. The fisheries enter-
prises are also woven into the network of regulations that define their relations to 
the fish, with other fishing states, the production, interpretation and application 
of science, and the development of gear and vessel technologies. In the current 
context, commercial fishing enterprises must be able to enter into transactions re-
lated to buying and selling fishing rights and quotas, undertake planning, obtain 
finance and credit, and evaluate, mitigate and when necessary cope and adapt to 
fishery-related risks.
Fewer people from traditional fishing communities have direct or indi-
rect access to wild fish for both personal consumption and sale (Hersoug 2005; 
Johnsen 2005; Holm and Nielsen 2007). In 1960 there where about 60,000 full-
time fishers in Norway, most of them working on smaller coastal vessels. In 2004, 
of about 12,000 full time fish harvesters, about 9,200 worked year round operat-
ing vessels that produced between eighty and one hundred percent of the catch 
and total value of Norwegian fisheries. Fifty-eight percent of these fishers worked 
on approximately 250 vessels over twenty-eight meters long, while the remaining 
forty-six percent worked on 1,800 vessels under twenty-eight meters that oper-
ated full-time.8 The increasing complexity in Norwegian fisheries management 
has led to increasing delegation of management from the management system to 
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the system-to-be-managed. Also rights and responsibilities for management and 
governance have been transferred from the public to the private sector, although 
public ‘ownership’ of the fish is still stated to be the main principle (White Paper 
(St.meld.) number 19 (2004-2005)). Fishing crews no longer have any legal rights 
to fish in the sea; fishing families and communities now depend more on repre-
sentatives of the commercial harvesting fleet to access fish to eat and exchange in 
the global seafood market.
Nature, represented by the fish, is now partially woven into the fishing 
enterprises. Based on vessel length and other criteria, the resource management 
model gives legitimate professionalized fish harvesters a certain biomass of fish 
or other marine resources to make decisions about and act upon. In so doing it 
has made exclusive rights and quotas to fish the basis for profitability and sus-
tainability within the industry. A boat is not only a fish killing machine, but also 
represents an option on a certain amount of fish, which to a great extent must be 
killed and taken from the ocean, as quickly as possible, to remain profitable and 
out on the water fishing. It is as Johnsen et al. (this issue) describe, a cybernetic 
organization, a fishing cyborg. If allocated fish are not found, killed and harvested, 
both managerial intervention mechanisms and the right to fish can be lost. By 
virtue of this process of rolling nature into the fishing enterprise, the longer term 
political goals of increased stability and reduced income variation within the Nor-
wegian fishing industry have, at least temporarily, come closer to reality. However, 
as pointed out by Standal and Aarset (2002), the policy has also favoured length-
ening fishing vessels, making it a promoter of technological modernisation and a 
driver of expanded capture capacity, despite the political goal to reduce such capac-
ity. This process is reflected in the economic surveys done by Budsjettnemda and 
the Norwegian Fisheries Directorate 1989-20079, which show that the long-term 
liabilities of the full-time operating fleet have increased since 1995. This reflects 
the increased technical standards and capital investments on the vessels (Johnsen 
2005). In addition several companies have also bought quotas and fishing rights. 
Even if fewer people and fewer boats are directly involved in fishing, they have to 
achieve a higher catch value than in 1995 in order to pay for the increased costs of 
investment following the cyborgization.
This change is reflected in the fact that many commercial fishing vessels 
today, even small ones, are organised as corporations and no longer as partner-
ships in Norway, Canada and around the world (Anon 2002; Johnsen 2005; Johns-
en and Vik 2008). Thus, the forms of organisation, institutional frameworks, 
rules for taxes and yield, and the financial situation of the global fishing fleet 
are much closer to the patterns we find in land-based corporate agri-businesses. 
When rights and quotas become elements in economic transactions, they can also 
be regarded as equity in the fisheries. Through this process institutions financing 
vessels gain more control over fishing activities and become intimate parts of the 
cybernetic fishing systems. Capital seeks investment opportunities, but with a 
smaller number of vessels and individuals with access to fisheries resources, posi-
tions from which to invest are becoming scarcer in global fisheries. When fewer 
fish, quotas, and people are involved, and larger amounts of capital are required 
to access marine resources, the result is sky-rocketing price increases for enter-
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ing into relationships. If the scarcity of fish and quotas increases the price of fish, 
quotas, and the related costs of fishing, and if more intensive resource exploitation 
becomes necessary to meet the increased costs and rents due on invested capital, 
then the ecological benefits of removing fishing people while attempting to man-
age fishing gear quickly disappear.
Fisheries policies and the cybernetic organisation of the fisheries give pri-
ority to economic exchange over eating fish caught in adjacent waters and thus 
contribute to directing the action of the fishing cyborgs. As a result, fishing en-
terprises are no longer regarded as producers of many products, like fish, labour 
and social benefits, but mainly as producers of added economic value for profitable 
exchange in global markets. Fish to eat and other informal payoffs are reduced as 
a result because the professionalized fishing system formalises as many practices 
and relationships as possible, subduing them to the interest of exchange. The 
fishing cyborgs must therefore act as economically rational actors, with huge con-
sequences for the fisheries and the management.
It is obvious that the fishing enterprise today is not only a boat, the crew 
members and the affective relations between the crew, but a mix of many profes-
sional systems that all aim to contribute to optimal efficiency in all subsystems of 
the operations for which they are responsible. One result of these changes is the re-
duced need for manpower. A steering position at the starboard reeling, behind the 
hauling equipment, is now a standard feature on all vessels under 50 foot, so that 
the skipper can control both the vessel and the fish hauling machinery from one 
position (figure 6). Mechanisation has made it possible for three men to tend the 
same number of gillnets on a forty-two foot fishing vessel as six men once strained 
Figure  5. Fish capture machines from Newfoundland (Photo: Peter R. Sinclair)
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to handle in the same period of time on a former sixty-four footer.10 Many skippers 
prefer to use as few crew members as possible, not only to have fewer hands to 
share in any profit, but because they want to lessen their responsibilities for other 
peoples’ lives and income. It is not unusual for two vessels to ‘buddy up’ and oper-
ate together. Sometimes two skippers also team up and work as crewmembers for 
each other. Through this ‘skipper fishery’ labour costs are reduced and specialised 
moves toward more efficient labour utilization are possible (Johnsen 2005).
This replacement of people by mechanical and institutional systems has 
changed all relations in Norwegian and other industrialized fisheries. Industrial 
mechanisation has led to a reduction in affective relations in the world’s fisheries. 
We can see similar, but not necessarily equal changes in fisheries in other parts of 
the world, for example in nl. Industrial for-profit fisheries are now nested within 
larger national and transnational fish harvesting systems based on the same ide-
ologies as the production and manufacturing of other industrial products and 
their supporting scientific rationalities. Through involvement in the capitalist 
treadmill of assembly line production and the ideology of industrialisation, the 
designers and producers of vessels’ and their equipment become more prominent 
in the relations that constitute fishing organizations. Contemporary fishing ves-
sels are not mainly used for transport or accommodation; they exist now as one 
systemic node in a globally integrated technological and symbolic fish harvesting 
and production system. Before, one vessel could easily be replaced by another and 
gear could be interchanged among vessels. Today, however, gear and vessels are 
constructed together. Even the highly efficient fish factory trawlers operating in 
the North Atlantic in the 1970s were not as tightly integrated and organised as 
today’s trawlers. Nor were they integrated into an overall fish killing system, as is 
evident in fishing vessels we see today (Warner 1983; Standal 2005).
The development of traditional inshore and coastal fishing practices into 
a situation where fishers undertake more and more standardised operations and 
systems with machines makes it reasonable to talk today about the gear, vessel and 
the crew as an integrated cybernetic system. As a matter of fact, fishing vessels 
have been transformed into highly effective capture machines, that have redefined 
the relationship between humans creating a new kind of fishing actor that is, part 
human, part systemic machine (Johnsen et al. 2005; See also Johnsen et al. in this 
issue).
The Cyborgization of the Fisherman
The existing Norwegian regulations give the seaman’s doctor the right to 
evaluate if a sailor with a Body Mass Index (bmi) between thirty and thirty-
five is for reasons of health unable to sail (Norwegian Minister of Health, 
Ansgar Gabrielsen 19.06.2002).
As one would expect with any professionalized technologically advanced operation, 
not every person can participate in commercial fishing. Physical and mental com-
patibility with techno-scientific fishing systems is now required to legitimately en-
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ter a modern managed fishery. Consequently, health, age, and physical disability 
can now be used to keep men and women off the water and to deny access to fish. 
Since contemporary fishers are not above, or outside, techno-scientific systems, as 
masters or possessors of fishing tools, they must be seen as an integrated part of 
the fishing machinery. To be an individual fishing operator today one must adapt 
to the machinery and systems that constitute contemporary commercial fishing 
networks (Johnsen 2004; Johnsen 2005). The dimensions of gear, the work speed 
expected, and the precision required in operations are of such a character that 
human energy, labour power, knowledge and ability alone are insufficient for the 
necessary and desired performance of fish production, distribution and consump-
tion systems. Expected performance is regulated and prescribed in documents 
and informal procedures, through regulations, laws, norms, values, expectations, 
and interest rates. In today’s commercial fisheries, fishermen and women cannot 
replace machinery and systems, but machinery and systems can replace people, 
because machinery and systems are adapted more easily than people to the de-
manding requirements of natural and regional regulations and universal codes 
of conduct for responsible fishing (Johnsen 2004; 2005). As described by Johnsen 
et al. in this issue, people’s performances in fishing are shaped, regulated, pro-
grammed, and governed by the demands and needs of the commercial production 
system, which often means the harvest machinery and a dense network of so-
cial and institutional relationships. As the quotation from the Minister of Health 
above states, fishermen and women’s bodies must now meet certain requirements 
that make them capable to interface effectively with the fishery systems they are 
now imagined to be embedded within. As performers, people have become more 
closely linked to and more dependent on the machines and the technological, 
scientific, and economic networks of which they are a part.
John11, a fish master, started his career in the herring fishery with only his 
hands, a line and a lead for sounding depth. He fished from an open skiff and had 
to rely upon his practical experience and senses to catch fish. Interviewed in 1997 
when he was sixty years old and still active, he stated that during his last years he 
simply touched a few buttons on the sonar system in the comfortable bridge of his 
modern purse seining vessel. He described his current fish practice as being dom-
inated by abstract technology rather than the personal feelings associated with his 
experienced sense of the touch, sound, taste and smells of fishing.12 Technology 
now helps to shape fishing performance, placing requirements on the operators, 
the technological and institutional networks that produce them as operators, and 
the huge variety of ideas, values, goals, and interests that are materially expressed 
through contemporary techno-scientific fishing systems.
Standardisation has reduced the need and opportunity for variation in 
practical fishing work as the fishing machines require standardized operational 
procedures that are in many cases much easier to teach and learn than the old 
embedded fishing practices. Subsequently, the former practices and the knowl-
edge linked to them vanish. Whereas in the past we could talk about human fish-
ers with individual fishing knowledge, more and more of the knowledge is now 
embedded in machinery, organizations, and systems rather than in the individual 
fisher. Fisheries knowledge has been transformed into institutionally useful in-
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formation and fishing relations have changed from primarily affective to cyber-
netic systemic interactions and feedbacks where managerial forms of knowledge 
and intervention rule over other ways of living.
Through this process, fishing people increasingly interact with automats, 
robots, institutions, and governance systems as Johnsen et al. describe in this 
issue. The fisher, who once was a hunter free to bait hooks, throw them into a 
common ocean and haul in a fish to eat or exchange for money, has been trans-
formed into an element in a cybernetic fishing system. The professionalized fish 
harvester is almost like a ‘robo fisher’. Harry, a fifty-six year old Norwegian skipper 
describes his transformation into a robo fisher by observing that now, ‘I’ve got a 
computer head’. Even if Harry’s head does not quite look like the head of the real 
Robo Cop on the beat in Detroit, Michigan, he nonetheless succinctly expresses the 
fact that contemporary commercial fish harvesters no longer rely on the embodied 
energy contained in their bodies or the fleshy nature of codfish hungry enough 
to go for bait. Fishers’ identities and practices are now thoroughly shaped and 
implemented through a variety of increasingly senseless and abstract biophysical 
systems and techno scientific techno-scientific networks. Within these systems 
and networks fishermen and women are reduced to elements in socio-ecological 
systems amenable to training and husbandry to maintain a profitable win-win bal-
ance between ecology and the industrial economy that brutally makes extinct and 
slaughters over twenty-five species a day in ‘a death wish beyond measure’ (Arney 
2007). Throughout this process human and natural resources are represented as 
available for capital to put to use and exploit in ever more efficient ways through 
the tools of fisheries (capture and culture) science, technology and management.
But the robo fisher is also linked to a similar type of process at the macro 
level, which moves the fisheries as a system toward a state of representation, regu-
lation, and intervention at all levels as Figure 1 depicts, but also where the distinc-
tion between the management system and the-system-to-be-managed disappears. 
Instead management is reorganised and a new division of labour develops. The 
practical execution becomes integrated in the practices, while the management 
system is more concerned with system design, control and monitoring in a close 
interaction with the users. The fisheries organizations become cyborgs as Johnsen 
et al. describe. While the term cyborg, in technical cybernetics means cybernetic 
organism and signifies an extreme interface between human and machine, we 
use the term cyborg for cybernetic organisation, which also allows us to include 
less extreme interfaces and to focus on the symbolic programming and the evolu-
tion of techno-scientific systems that takes place in today’s fisheries (see Haraway 
1997; Mirowski 2002). Even if this process of cyborgization at the micro level is 
more radical in Norwegian coastal fisheries than, for example, in Canada, it is also 
possible to identify a movement towards cybernetic organisation in nl and other 
commercial coastal fisheries worldwide (Murray, et al. 2006; See also Johnsen et 
al. in this issue).
Although increasing amounts of ‘fishing knowledge’ are built into and in-
tegrated with techno-scientific systems, this does not mean that anybody can oc-
cupy the human operator positions in the cybernetic fishing system and network. 
As mentioned previously, only certified people can operate and become success-
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fully integrated as robo fishers. Even if the selection process for harvesters is not 
as extreme as when fighter pilots are selected, the move from rejection by the 
fishing community or self-selection into the fishing commons to today’s discrimi-
nation is based on some shared striking similarities. Cybernetic fish harvesting 
requires specialists to take care of and operate the different bits, bytes, pieces, 
elements and relations that constitute contemporary fishing systems rather than 
the general all round set of knowledge and skills traditionally associated with the 
fishers. Furthermore, neither the development of advanced fish killing machines, 
nor the further evolution and integration of the robo fisher restricts opportuni-
ties for further development of contemporary commercial fisheries. Even if tech-
nology contributes to a restricted sense of what fishing practice can become, the 
restructuring of technological development has also opened up expansive new 
opportunities for a few. The question on everyone’s lips today, however, is: ‘With 
industrial fish capture machines and robo fishers ruling the world’s oceans, can 
wild fish remain unchanged?’. The answer is obvious and it is ‘No!’.
The Variable Ontology of the Actors in the Fisheries
As long as the ideology of the Norwegian government, the industry and the ‘of-
ficial’ scientific framework for analysis give a prominent position to ‘economic 
rationality’ and financial ‘mechanisms,’ there will be a constant drive towards 
greater capitalisation in the fisheries (Standal and Aarset 2002; Standal 2003; 
Johnsen 2005; Standal 2005). The combination of profitability, management, and 
governance requirements has caused the vacuum created by those people and ves-
sels that have left, and this vacuum has been rapidly filled by cyborgs and en-
hanced technological capture capacity. The reason why this is so is actually simple 
to understand. The ontological starting point for ideology formulation and the 
building up of fisheries management and governance institutions has been the 
individual, human rational actor and fish understood as members of a single spe-
cies population. By regarding fishing people as individuated harvesters in need of 
social control and fishing as the removal of surplus production or biomass from 
single species fish populations, the agency of fish and fishing people as social, 
relational living beings is completely overlooked. With fisheries policy focussed 
on individual action and technocratic solutions, the contribution of policy, science, 
economics, and technology to the creation of cybernetic fish killing systems has 
remained invisible.
As in other North Atlantic states, pressures to modernise and increase 
profitability, technological and economic efficiency have become increasingly im-
portant in Norwegian fisheries policy. The difference between the effective tech-
nologies of the fifties, for example the factory freezer trawlers, and today is that 
in the 1950s these fish killers were beyond regulation and control (Johnsen 2005; 
Murray, Neis et al. 2006). (See Johnsen et al. and Sinclair et al. in this issue.) To-
day they represent important mechanisms in the cybernetic organisation of the 
fisheries Leviathan and as such their power has been increased, not diminished 
as originally planned.
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The cyborgization processes define not only the relations between the fish 
and the individual fisherman, but also the appropriate actions that are required 
to be defined as a legitimate fisherman (see Bavington; Nordstrand and Holm; 
Johnsen et al. and Sinclair et al. in this issue). Even if the owners and skippers are 
still able to make choices and decisions, the integrated cyborg systems of which 
they are a part constrain the menu of choices, opportunities for decision making, 
and legitimized ontologies limit options available to fishing people. Seen from 
this perspective, the killing machine, the robo fisher, and the cyborg fish are all 
products of policy, science, technological development, markets, human relations, 
personal interests, skills and abilities that operate systematically in concert.
The current state of the world’s oceans and fishing communities is partly 
the result of more than fifty years of fisheries management policies in the North 
Atlantic – policies created with the ambition to manage fisheries resources in a 
rational and profitable way. Through mechanisms and technology for fish count-
ing, technological modernizing, concentration, and capital investment on behalf 
of employment and decentralisation, the actors in the fisheries have been trans-
formed from unmanageable subjects into domesticated elements in a cybernetic 
fisheries management regime with economic rationality used as the main criterion 
to judge success. The result is that fish mortality is higher now than ever recorded 
and capture capacity is greater than the available fish in the sea. Furthermore, the 
long term liabilities of fish harvesters have continued to increase – which implies 
that fish mortality must also continue to grow and produce expected revenues to 
service capital investments in the fishing industry. Paradoxically, contemporary 
fish capture machines, robo fishers, and the system of which they are part are now 
so complex that the evaluation criteria do not do justice to the system.
The Future of the Fishing Cyborgs
Despite successes in turning resource management into the central policy issue 
within global commercial fisheries, and despite the incredible effectiveness of 
modernising global fisheries into a much more profitable, safe and secure busi-
ness, the fisheries cyborgs are not stable entities. Fisheries management is, if not 
in crisis, at least continuously disputed. One of the reasons for this is that the cen-
tral goal of fisheries management – to reduce harvesting capacity and rebuild fish 
stocks up to msy levels – has not been fulfilled in many places. In fact, manage-
ment and governance systems seem to have contributed what they were ostensibly 
designed to prevent – stock collapses and increased harvesting capacity (Standal 
and Aarset 2002; Standal 2003; Johnsen 2005; Standal 2005; Bavington this issue; 
Johnsen et al. this issue). This is an awfully strange and destructive paradox. The 
cybernetic harvesting systems seem impossible to effectively control or manage. 
The efficiency, power, and demand for fish in the managerial cyborg fishing sys-
tem are so huge that industrial capture machines have not only laid waste to fish 
and fishers, but are now ‘killing’ each other through processes of consolidation, 
restructuring, and reshaping the relations and elements that constitute the sys-
tems’ integrity. A pivotal question is whether the remains of the fishing Leviathan 
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itself, the pieces of centralized government, will survive these attacks or if we will 
end up with fully privatised fisheries where capture machines, perhaps even more 
automated and robotised than today, perform desperate acts of cannibalism to 
put the many cyborgs it conjured into existence under effective control. Or maybe 
there is still hope?
We do not know how this managerial cyborg story will end, but as de-
scribed we see a movement towards delegation of management practices and to-
ward self-control. The management system becomes more closely integrated into 
the capture system. Perhaps the contextualists’ ideas about co-management and 
participation are closer to reality than the Leviathan? But this co-management 
may take place through cybernetic relationships in professional systems or net-
works more than through affective relations in fishing communities. Thus, the 
model in Figure 1 is probably illustrating the past. The two subsystems seem to 
have closer and closer interaction, and processes that before took place outside 
the capture system are today integrated into it. As mentioned above, neither man-
agement nor the cyborgs remains unchanged when controversies erupt between 
different groups of scientists, stakeholders and public interest groups out in the 
ocean and along the coast. A consequence of the many challenges and disputes 
in fisheries is the struggle to establish continuously new relations in desperate 
attempts to cope with rapidly rising challenges. Today, there are movements to-
wards the inclusion of local fishers’ knowledge, more open and participatory sci-
entific methods, increased user participation in decision making, expansion of 
market over state-based management, claims for traditional rights and rights for 
new groups. The results are still uncertain. Profitability, precautionarity, ecosys-
tem approaches, the emergence of industrial carnivorous aquaculture and many 
other issues are relevant to how fisheries resource management will develop in 
the future and if it will be able to continue to exist as a politically and morally vi-
able option for humankind. All attempts to stabilize the cyborgs and the fisheries 
management system make cybernetic fisheries management systems even more 
heterogeneous and make the actors’ ontology more uncertain and variable. With 
all these dynamics in mind, opening up the black boxes of the cybernetic fisher-
ies management to make visible some of the relations, actors, practices, symbols, 
rhetoric, changes, and the translations that hold this heterogeneous network to-
gether will be the necessary first steps to begin to understand how fisheries man-
agement actually functions and what it brings to the marine world.
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1 Participant observation by Jahn Petter Johnsen on a fishing boat taking part in the Lofoten 
arctic cod fishery in March 2007.
2 Speech given by former Norwegian Minister of Fisheries, Svein Ludvigsen, in 2005. 
Ressurs, regulering og forvaltning. Foredrag på årsmøte i Troms Fiskarfylking, Tromsø, 17. 
juni 2005
3 The project ´The Coming of the Cyborg Fish’ funded by the Norwegian Research Council.
4 Observations and interviews on board a fishing vessel in the Lofoten cod fishery in 
2007, for instance, gave the impression that the skipper and the crew actively controlled 
themselves, an impression that is confirmed by the Chief Public Prosecutor for fisheries 
crime in Norway (Fause 2007). Their internal control was related to fishing areas, quota, 
quality, and behaviour in relation to the other vessels on the grounds. The fishers not only 
passively comply with a set of rules, but perform them actively, by for example organizing 
the fishing and arranging the vessel in a way that makes control easier. One example is 
to reduce or increase the amount of gear when the sounder records large amounts of fish, 
to be able to get more stable catches from day to day and to secure quality. Moreover the 
fishers are obliged to record their catch in a log book. To get as accurate an estimate as 
possible, they can both measure the amount of fish that the bleeding bin takes and arrange 
the hold with boxes so the amount of fish can be easily and accurately estimated. 
5 In Norway for example, the institutional setup gives considerable power to the Norwegian 
Fishermen’s Organization (NFA), which has taken the responsibility to negotiate long-term 
quota allocation agreements between vessel groups. NFA’s recommendations are followed 
more or less automatically by the Ministry of Fisheries. With a decreasing number of 
fishers and vessels fishing with permits and licences on limited quotas, requirements of 
feedback of scientifically coded information to the management system becomes more 
structured, and in some sense, easier. NFA also has influence over the technical regulation 
of the fisheries. By delegating and distributing this responsibility to a stakeholder 
organization, compliance becomes a smaller problem, and a link is created between 
individual interest and decision making on board the individual vessel and decision 
making at a central level. Since NFA started to take this responsibility in the early 1990s, 
the organization has become a part of the management system, and not in opposition to 
it. In this way the fishers’ interests are built directly into the management system, and the 
interaction between the individual vessel and the management system become closer.
6 In the description here we draw on, amongst others, Johnsen’s (2004; 2005) studies of 
change in Norwegian fisheries. The data sources are qualitative interviews, observations, 
material from fishery technology producers, technical journals, and documentaries.
7 The practices onboard a modern Norwegian gill net vessel are documented on the video 
‘Fishing Cod’ by Jahn Petter Johnsen (2007). The video consists of clips shot under 
fieldwork onboard a cod fishing vessel in Lofoten in March 2007.
8 Figures from the Directorate of Fisheries in Norway (2004) and Norway Statistics (1961)
9 Budsjettnemda, the Budget Committee was until 2004 evaluating the economic situation 
in the Norwegian fishing fleet. Reports from 1989-2004 are used. After 2004 the 
Fisheries Directorate have made reports about the economic conditions in the Norwegian 
fishing fleet. See: http://www.fiskeridir.no/fiskeridir/fiske_og_fangst/statistikk/
loennsomhetsundersoekelse_for_fiskeflaaten
10 The changes in the cod fisheries are described in Johnsen (2005). The description is 
updated with information based on observations, video recordings, and interviews from a 
cod fishing vessel in March 2007. 
11 The three fishers John, Harry, and Henry were interviewed in the late 1990s: See 
Johnsen 2004. Their stories are not unique, material collected through observation and 
interviews by Johnsen 2001, see also Standal (2003, 2004) that indicate that the process of 
cyborgization is still going on. 
12 The situation is probably even more radical today. In episode 2 of The Norwegian 
Television program ´Der fartøy flyte kan’ http://www.nrk.no/nett-tv/klipp/246653/ we 
can follow the skipper and the crew onboard Norway’s most advanced purse seiner in 
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their hunt for mackerel. We can also see one of Norway’s few female fishers fishing cod 
onboard her small, but technologically sophisticated coastal vessel, and follow the crew on 
Norway’s oldest fishing vessel during the still labour intensive sprat fishery in a Norwegian 
fiord. See also Discovery Channel’s famous reality show: ´The Deadliest Catch’ from the 
Alaska Crab fishery. These television programs illustrate that modern fishing is technology 
intensive and dependent. We also get an impression of how the skippers and the crew 
adapt to management. Onboard on the Norwegian purse seiner, the skipper waits with the 
deployment of the gear until the sonar picture has such a character that he feels confident 
that the school of mackerel is big enough to fill the rest of the quota. 
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